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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CHERYL L. RUSHTON,

:

Applicant/Appellant

:
: Supreme Court No. 8600095
vs.
:
: Industrial Comm. No.:
GELCO EXPRESS and EMPLOYERS
:
85 000816
MUTUAL LIABILITY OF WAUSAU,
:
: Category 6
Defendants/Respondents:

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL
The sole issue on appeal is whether there is
sufficient competent evidence in the record to sustain the
findings of the Administrative Law Judge, which findings were
affirmed by the Commission on February 3, 1986.
NATURE OF THE CASE
On December 27, 1983, while in the course and scope
of her employment, appellant slipped and fell in the parking
lot of her employer.

She subsequently filed an Application for

Hearing before the Industrial Commission claiming both
temporary total and permanent partial disability benefits.
Following a medical panel evaluation of the appellant, the
Administrative Law Judge ordered the respondents to pay all of
the appellant's reasonable medical expenses incurred as a
result of the accident plus temporary total disability benefits
from December 27, 1983 through August 31, 1984. He denied the
-2-

appellant's claim for permanent partial disability benefits.
The Commission affirmed the Order of the Administrative Law
Judge on February 3, 1986 and this appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

On December 27, 1983, the appellant slipped on

ice and snow in the parking lot of her employer and fell to her
hands and knees.
2.

(R. at 2).

After this fall, appellant began experiencing

pain in her upper back, neck and arms.
3.

(R. at 2 ) .

Appellant reported the accident to her employer

and was paid temporary total disability benefits from December
28, 1983 to August 26, 1984.

In addition, medical payments

were made on her behalf in the amount of $3,141.23.

(R. at 2,

74).
4.

On September 13, 1984, appellant filed an

Application for Hearing with the Industrial Commission.

In the

Application, appellant claimed additional temporary total plus
permanent partial disability benefits for an injury to her
back.

(R. at 25) .
5.

Prior to the date appellant filed her

application, three different doctors had indicated that her
condition was medically stable and she could return to work.
(R. at 7, 15, 19) .
6.

In October 1984, approximately ten months after

her fall, appellant began to complain of pain in her knees to
Dr. Gordon R. Kimball.

(R. at 35).
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7.

X-rays of appellant's knees revealed a lateral

riding patella which Dr. Kimball diagnosed as "bilateral
traumatic chondromalacia of the patella secondary to the
accident." (R. at 35).
8.

Dr. Kimball further stated, however, that

although he suspected the accident caused the appellant's knee
problems, argument on this issue was highly likely. (R. at 35) .
9.

Objective tests performed on the appellant

included a CT scan of her cervical spine, an EMG, x-rays of
her neck and a bone scan.

The results of all of these tests

were normal with the exception of a "slight reversal of the
normal cervical ordodic curve in the mid portion of the
cervical spine."
10.

(R. at 7, 34, 35).

Appellant was eventually referred for evaluation

to a medical panel appointed by the Commission.

The medical

panel found appellant was temporarily totally disabled as a
result of the industrial accident through August 1984.

It also

determined that appellant had suffered no permanent partial
disability as a result of the industrial accident.

(R. at 41,

42) .
11.

On December 31, 1985, the Administrative Law

Judge issued a Supplemental Order in response to the
appellant's Motion for Review.

Therein he adopted the findings

of the medical panel with regard to the issues of appellant's
temporary total disability and permanent partial disability.
(R. at 76).
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The findings of the Industrial Commission cannot be
overturned on appeal in the absence of a showing that its
findings are arbitrary and capricious.

Findings are not

arbitrary and capricious where they are supported by
substantial competent evidence.

In the instant case, the

evidence in the record is clearly sufficient to support the
findings of the Commission, therefore, its order must be
affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE FINDINGS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION CANNOT
BE OVERTURNED ON APPEAL SO LONG AS THEY ARE SUPPORTED
BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
Utah Code Annotated, §35-1-84 (1953 as amended)
provides that upon review of an order of the Industrial
Commission, the Supreme Court may affirm or set aside the
award.

However, an award may only be set aside upon the

following grounds:
(1)

That the Commission acted without or in
excess of its powers;

(2)

That the findings of fact do not support the
award.
The standard of review identified in §35-1-84 is

a limited one as is evidenced by the decision in Blaine v.
Industrial Commission of Utah, 700 P.2d 1084 (Utah 1985).
Therein the Court stated:
This Court has interpreted the foregoing statutory
standard [§35-1-84] on numerous occasions and
has concluded that the Commission's findings are
not to be displaced in the absence of a showing
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that they are arbitrary and capricious. (Footnote
omitted).
Id. at 1086.

Findings of the Commission are deemed to be

arbitrary and capricious only where there is no substantial
competent evidence to support them.

This fact is illustrated

by the decision in Vause v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah
2d 217, 407 P.2d 1006, 1008 (1965) where the following comment
was made:
This Court cannot properly reverse the Commission
and compel an award unless there is credible
evidence without substantial contradiction which
points so clearly and persuasively in plaintiff's
favor that failure to so find would justify the
conclusion that the Commission acted capriciously,
arbitrarily or unreasonably in disregarding or
refusing to believe the evidence.
See also Garner v. Hecla Mining Co., 19 Utah 2d 367,
431 P.2d 794, 796 (1967).

In the instant case, there is no

question but that there is substantial competent evidence in
the record to support the findings and order of the
Administrative Law Judge.

Thus, the decision of the Commission

must not be disturbed.
A.
The Administrative Law Judge's Award Of Temporary
Total Disability Benefits From December 27, 1983 Through
August 31, 1984 Was Not Arbitrary and Capricious
As There Was Conflicting Medical Evidence On The
Issue Of Temporary Total Disability.
The Administrative Law Judge awarded temporary total
disability benefits to the appellant from December 27, 1983
through August 31, 1984. Appellant claims she is entitled to
additional benefits through November 30, 1984, based upon the
report of her treating physician Dr. Gordon R. Kimball.
addition to the report of Dr. Kimball, however, the
-6-

In

Administrative Law Judge had before him the conflicting reports
of several other qualified physicians.

For example, Dr. Dennis

D. Thoen, a neurologist who examined the appellant for
purposes of an independent medical examination, diagnosed
appellant's injury as a "mild cervical strain" which, as of the
date of his examination on July 17, 1984, had resolved.
19).

(R. at

He indicated that he believed appellant could return to

light duty work (work not requiring any lifting over 3 0 pounds)
at that time and that she could work without restriction if she
would be willing to involve herself in a rigorous physical
fitness program for three to four weeks.
Dr. Thoen was not the only doctor who felt the
appellant's condition was stable enough for her to return to
work prior to November 30, 1984. Dr. Gerard Vanderhooft,
made the following statement in a letter to Di:. Wayne Zundel
dated January 19, 1984, just three weeks after the appellant's
fall:
This is one of those difficult cases where the
objective of [sic] findings do not corroborate the
patient's subjective symptoms. In a nice way I
explained this to her and suggested to her that
she return to work as soon as possible. . . . I
certainly do not believe that any harm would occur
if she did return to work, but how much pain a
person has following a soft tissue injury is very
difficult to predict. . . . Suffice it to say that
I would think it would be in everyone's best
interest for her to return to work as soon as
possible • • ••
(R. at 7).

And finally, Dr. Walter Reichert, another treating

physician, indicated that he was going to release the appellant
to return to work in mid-April 1984:
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I will release the patient to return to work on
April 16. . . . She will continue with the
aggressive physical therapy in the next week prior
to her back-to-work date at which time I have
released her for full duty.
(R. at 15).

As can be seen from the evidence presented above,

there were clear conflicts in the record regarding the period
of appellant's temporary total disability.

Therefore, the

Administrative Law Judge submitted the matter to a medical
panel for an impartial evaluation.

In its report dated May 11,

1985, the medical panel found appellant's period of temporary
total disability to extend from the date of her injury through
August 1984. The Administrative Law Judge subsequently adopted
the panel's finding as his own and ordered temporary total
disability benefits to be paid to the appellant through August
31, 1984.

Because there is competent evidence supporting the

award which was made, the Commission's order must be affirmed.
B.
The Commission Is The Trier of Fact And It Is
Not Bound To Defer To The Testimony Of The Appellant's
Treating Physician Where There Is Other Conflicting
Medical Testimony In The Record.
In Point III of her brief, appellant contends that
where the medical panel report and the treating physician's
report are conflicting, as in the instant case, the
Administrative Law Judge should be required as a matter of law
to defer to the report of the appellant's treating physician.
This argument, however, flies in the face of the
well-established rule that the Commission is the recognized
trier of fact in workmen's compensation proceedings.
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See Mollerup Van Lines v. Adams, 16 Utah 2d 235, 398 P.2d
882, 885 (1965); Clinger v. Industrial Commission of Utah,
571 P.2d 1328, 1329 (Utah 1977).

This fact finding role of the

Commission was acknowledged and the proposition appellant
espouses specifically rejected in Mellen v. Industrial
Commission, 19 Utah 2d 373, 431 P.2d 798 (1967).

In

Mellen the applicant sought workmen's compensation benefits
after suffering a heart attack.

The applicant's treating

physician testified that the applicant's heart attack may have
been brought on by exertion on the job.

The medical panel, on

the other hand, found it to be the natural result of a
degenerative condition.

The Administrative Law Judge adopted

the findings of the panel and the applicant appealed.

The Utah

Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Commission stating:
The Commission is the fact-finder in cases like
this and in its conclusion in such a case, we
cannot say that it must reject the panel's canvass
of the facts in favor of the qualified opinion of
plaintiff's personal physician. (Emphasis added).
Id. at 799.
As support for her position that the report of a
treating physician is entitled to greater deference than any
other medical evidence, appellant cites severcil social security
cases.

However, a review of those decisions only confirms the

contention of the respondents that where there is conflicting
evidence in the record, the Commission is the entity
responsible for resolving those conflicts and where its
findings are supported by competent evidence, they should not
be disturbed.
-9

In fulfilling its role as the fact-finder, the
Commission must not only not defer to the evidence of any
particular party, but it must weigh all of the evidence
presented before reaching a final decision.

The responsibility

of the Commission in this regard was discussed in Moyes on
Behalf of Moyes v. State, 699 P.2d 748 (Utah 1985).

Therein,

the petitioner filed a Writ of Review to set aside an order of
the Industrial Commission.

She alleged in part that the

Commission had acted arbitrarily and capriciously by adopting
portions of the medical panel's report in its findings of
fact.

The Court first noted that it is not unusual for the

Commission to adopt the report of the medical panel in its
findings and then it stated:
We have noted, however, that in 'discharging [the
Commission's] responsibility it [is] the
prerogative and duty of the Commission to consider
not only the report of the medical panel, but also
all of the other evidence and to draw whatever
inferences and deductions [that] fairly and
reasonably could be derived therefrom.' IGA
Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d at 830.
Consideration of the other evidence does not
require that the Administrative Law Judge or the
Commission ignore or rewrite the medical panel
report if they agree with it and deem it an
adequate summary of their own findings. All that
is required is some indication that the
Administrative Law considered the other evidence
and that his findings are fair and reasonable in
light of all the evidence. (Emphasis added).
Id. at 753.

It is apparent in the instant case that the

Administrative Law Judge considered all of the evidence in the
record before adopting the report of the medical panel in his
findings of fact.

It is also apparent that the conclusions he

reached are fair and reasonable in light of all the evidence.
-10-

Various portions of the testimony of each of the physicians who
attended the appellant are cited in both the original Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and in the Supplemental
Order.

Furthermore, the Administrative Law Judge made the

following specific finding with regard to the appellant's claim
for permanent partial disability benefits:
The Administrative Law Judge adopts the findings
of the medical panel report dated May 11, 1985
that the Applicant did not sustain a permanent
partial impairment as a direct result of the
industrial injury. See medical panel report dated
May 11, 1985, page 2, item 5. Based upon the
medical records in the Industrial Commission file
from Dr. Gerard F. Vanderhooft; Dr. Dennis
Thoen; and Dr. Walter H. Reichert, the findings
of the medical panel is [sic] accurate and
correct.
(R. at 74).

(See also R. at 62).

The reports of Dr.

Vanderhooft, Thoen and Reichert indicate no permanent
partial disability of any kind suffered by the appellant.
Although Dr. Kimball gave appellant an impairment rating of
9%, he expressed some definite reservations about his
findings.

For example, in discussing appellant's impairment

due to her cervical sprain he stated: "^f she has any
permanent partial disability rating it would be no more than 5%
for the chronic cervical sprain . . .."
at 36).

(Emphasis added). (R.

In a later report dated October 3, 1985, Dr. Kimball

reaffirmed this 5% impairment rating but he noted that the
rating was based more on subjective symptoms than on objective
findings and that it was given "in spite of the fact that there
[was] no evidence of disc or bony injury."

(R. at 56).

His

finding that the appellant's knee problems were caused by the
-11-

industrial accident was also tentative as evidenced by his
ready acknowledgement that this conclusion was subject to
argument.

And finally, Dr. Kimball stated with regard to the

appellant's overall rating:

"This might give her a total

overall disability rating of 9% of the whole man as a result of
the industrial accident."

(R. at 36).

The only other report giving the appellant a ratable
impairment was the medical panel report.

However, it found her

total impairment to be only 2% of the whole man.

Furthermore,

it found the entire 2% impairment to be the result of
pre-existing congenital problems affecting her knees. The
appellant was not found to have suffered any impairment as a
result of cervical sprain.

The medical panel's finding in this

regard does not appear to be unreasonable in view of the
qualified findings of the appellant's own treating physician
and in view of the fact that no other treating physician felt
appellant had suffered any impairment at all. Furthermore,
where the appellant did not complain of knee pain until
approximately ten months after the industrial accident
occurred, and where Dr. Kimball admitted that his conclusion
that appellant's knee problems were caused by the accident was
arguable, it was not arbitrary for the Commission to adopt the
medical panel's finding of no impairment attributable to the
industrial accident.

-12-

C. Appellant Is Not Entitled To Benefits From
The Second Injury Fund For The Pre-existing
Condition Of Her Knees Because Her Impairment Was
Not Greater After The Industrial Accident
As previously noted, the medical panel assigned to
evaluate the appellant's condition found her to have a 2% whole
body impairment as a result of "congenital or developmental
symmetrical spurring of articular surfaces of the patellas."
(R. at 42).

The panel also found that the entire 2% was

attributable to pre-existing conditions.

These findings were

adopted by the Administrative Law Judge and appellant now
contends she is entitled to benefits from the Second Injury
Fund for this pre-existing impairment.

Second Injury Fund

participation is governed by U.C.A., §35-1-69. That
section reads in part as follows:
If any employee who has previously incurred a
permanent incapacity by accidental injury, disease,
or congenital causes, sustains an industrial
injury for which either compensation or medical
care, or both, is provided by this chapter that
results in permanent incapacity which is
substantially greater than he would have incurred
if he had not had the pre-existing incapacity,
or which aggravates or is aggravated by such
pre-existing incapacity, compensation, medical
care and other related items as outlined in Section
35-1-81, shall be awarded on the basis of the
combined injuries, but the liability of employer
for such compensation, medical care, and other
related items shall be for the industrial injury
only. (Emphasis added).
It is apparent after reading §35-1-69 that the
Second Injury Fund is only liable for benefits where the
industrial injury results in a permanent incapacity after the
accident which is substantially greater than the incapacity the
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applicant would have had if he/she had not had the
pre-existing condition.

See Kaiser Steel Corp. v.

Industrial Commission of Utah, 709 P.2d 1168, 1170 (Utah 1985)
("Second Injury Fund Liability is imposed, not when the second
injury itself causes a 'substantially greater' incapacity, but
when the worker's total incapacity following the second injury
is 'substantially greater' than it would have been but for the
pre-existing incapacity.").

In the instant case, the

Administrative Law Judge determined that the industrial
accident of December 27, 1983, did not cause the appellant to
suffer any additional impairment.

Thus, her impairment after

the accident was the same as it was before the accident. Under
these circumstances, appellant does not meet the threshold
requirement for triggering Second Injury Fund participation.
Appellant further contends there is no evidence in
the record to support the Administrative Law Judge's finding
that the condition of claimant's knees was only temporarily
aggravated by the industrial accident.

However, a review of

Dr. Chester Powell's consultation report proves otherwise.
For example, after reviewing the x-rays of appellant's knees,
Dr. Powell noted that the changes seen were minimal, were old
and were suggestive of a developmental abnormality.
47).

(R. at 46,

He also stated that there were no current clinical

findings affecting appellant's knees at the time of his
examination and that she was not in continual discomfort as a
result of her knee problems.

He then concluded:
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It is reasonable in retrospect to consider that
Mrs. Rushton sustained some degree of a cervical
strain and perhaps a contusion of her knees but
the circumstances of the accident and the described
character of the x-ray changes of the knees
suggests these are more probably developmental
changes and not attributable to that specific
accident. (Emphasis added).
(R. at 47).

Furthermore, although appellant alleges the

medical panel made a definite finding that the industrial
accident aggravated her knee condition, in reality it found as
follows:
It is possible the circumstances of the accident
activated a symptomatic phase of the changes seen
in the knees. (Emphasis added).
(R. at 42).

It is apparent, after reviewing the complete

finding, that it was not definitely concluded by the panel that
appellant's knees were, in fact, aggravated by her fall.

The

evidence that Dr. Powell, chairman of the medical panel, found
only that appellant may have suffered a possible bruising of
her knees due to her fall together with the evidence that
appellant failed to report any problems with her knees for ten
months following the accident, lends support to the
Administrative Law Judge's finding that any aggravation
possibly suffered by the appellant was only temporary.

Even if

the Administrative Law Judge acted improperly in finding
appellant's condition to have been temporarily aggravated by
the industrial accident, however, the outcome remains the same
for appellant was not found to have a "substantially greater"
total incapacity following the accident.
before and after remained the same.
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Rather her incapacity

Thus Second Injury Fund

participation is not warranted and the Order of the
Administrative Law Judge to this effect should be affirmed.
II.
RULE 1.1.10 OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION RULES
AND REGULATIONS PROCEDURE EFFECTIVE AUGUST 17, 1984,
IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE ATTORNEY'S FEES TO WHICH COUNSEL FOR
THE APPELLANT IS ENTITLED
U.C.A., §35-1-87 grants to the Commission the
authority to regulate and fix the fees of attorneys
representing applicants in Industrial Commission cases. Rule
1.1.10 of the Worker's Compensation Rules and Regulations Procedure Effective August 17, 1984 was adopted pursuant to the
authority granted in §35-1-87. Rule 1.1.10 indicates that
an applicant's counsel is entitled receive fees in accordance
with the schedule set forth therein although some discretion
may be used by the Administrative Law Judge if the fees under
the schedule would be unconscionable to either the applicant or
his counsel.

The provision of the schedule applicable in the

instant case provides that an applicant's counsel is entitled
to receive "20% of weekly compensation generated for the first
$15,000. . . . "

In the instant case the only compensation

generated by appellant's attorney over and above the
compensation that had already been paid to the applicant prior
to the filing of her Application for Hearing was temporary
total disability benefits from August 27, 1984 to August 31,
1984.

Therefore appellant's attorney is entitled to 20% of the

total of four days of temporary total disability benefits
unless the Administrative Law Judge in his discretion
determines other fees are appropriate.
-16-

CONCLUSION
Findings of the Industrial Commission cannot be
overturned in the absence of a showing that they are arbitrary
and capricious. Where the findings of the Industrial
Commission are supported by substantial competent evidence they
are not arbitrary and capricious.

As the trier of fact the

Commission is entitled to weigh all of the evidence before it
and to assess the credibility of the evidence and the witnesses
in making its findings.

The Commission followed this procedure

in the instant case and there is ample evidence in the record
to sustain its findings, therefore, its order of December 31,
1984 should be affirmed.

1986.
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